Cybersecurity has plenty of tools that report signals. What is missing is a trusted layer that proves what is protected, what is merely claimed, and what can be changed with authority.
The gap
Security teams drown in findings, but still cannot answer the board’s simplest question
Are our critical paths actually protected?
Not “does one product support PQC,” not “did a scanner see a version,” and not “does a dashboard look green.” QASO ties observed behavior to validated claims, owners, policy, and governed response.
QASO answer
Observe the estate. Validate the claim. Approve the action. Prove the result.
SignalEvidenceDecisionAction
Secure observes the estateAssure validates the claimSOAR governs the action
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · what is missing
The missing security layer
02
The cybersecurity space is crowded with scanners, dashboards, ticket queues, and playbooks. QASO connects them into one evidence-to-action system.
Tools see pieces
A scanner sees one component
Useful, but it does not prove the real business path is protected end to end.
Claims drift
Dashboards turn support into certainty
A product can support a control while the estate negotiates something weaker in production.
Owners vanish
Findings lose authority
Teams can debate a risk for weeks when evidence, policy, and approval live in different systems.
Actions need proof
Automation needs a boundary
Response should be scoped, approved, reversible, and verified after it runs.
Why unique
QASO is not another scanner; it is the operating layer above security evidence
Secure observes infrastructure relationships. Assure tests whether claims are defensible. SOAR routes governed response. The result is a living proof graph, not another pile of alerts.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · crypto baseline
The crypto shift
03
PQC changes the public-key algorithms used for key establishment and signatures. Bulk encryption still relies on fast symmetric cryptography such as AES.
Standardized PQC algorithms replace the vulnerable public-key layer
Key establishmentML-KEM or hybrid classical plus PQC
AuthenticationML-DSA or SLH-DSA where supported
Bulk encryptionAES remains the high-speed data cipher
Why this matters
Inventory alone cannot answer readiness
The practical question sits inside each handshake and each trust boundary: what algorithm was negotiated, what certificate authenticated the peer, and does that match policy for this path?
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · handshake mechanics
Identity is still the hard part
04
A connection can have strong key establishment and still authenticate the wrong party. PQC migration must cover both shared secrets and identity binding.
Confidential key establishment
Two systems derive shared secret material that feeds symmetric session encryption.
Current: ECDHEPQC target: ML-KEM or hybrid KEM
Endpoint authentication
A certificate and signature bind the public key to an identity and prove private-key possession.
Current: RSA and ECDSAPQC target: ML-DSA or SLH-DSA where the ecosystem supports it
Implementation implication
Secure needs evidence from both sides of the handshake
Secure records negotiated key establishment, certificate chain, signature algorithm, endpoint identity, and source of observation. Assure replays whether that evidence supports the claim. SOAR acts only after policy and owner approval.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · vendor-upgrade gap
Capable is not protected
05
A server can support hybrid PQC while real clients still negotiate classical key exchange through old libraries, proxies, or fallback behavior.
Server after upgradeX25519 · secp256r1 · X25519 plus ML-KEM hybrid
Client AHybrid PQ negotiated
Client BFallback to X25519
Client CLegacy library path
Observed protected path Observed vulnerable paths
Why the gap happens
Capability can diverge from traffic
Old clients, load balancers, TLS termination, protocol limits, unsupported downstream services, and misconfiguration can all cause a classical negotiation even when the upgraded component advertises PQC support.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · security-state model
The state model
06
Secure should model each state separately, then calculate the gap between required policy and observed behavior.
Policy evidenceCriticality, data class, trust boundary, required algorithm, exception owner
Secure observes the estateAssure validates the claimSOAR governs the action
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · quantum timing model
Mosca becomes operational
07
Secure should calculate quantum urgency per relationship: protect first where data shelf life plus migration time exceeds the credible quantum threat horizon.
SShelf life
How long the data or transaction must stay confidential after capture.
+
MMigration time
How long the owner needs to upgrade, test, approve, and deploy PQC controls.
>
QQuantum horizon
Estimated time until cryptographically relevant quantum capability threatens the algorithm.
Secure calculation inputs
Secure turns Mosca from a policy worksheet into an evidence-backed risk graph
RelationshipSource, destination, protocol, business owner, data class, trust boundary
Timing pressureShelf life plus migration time compared with the selected quantum horizon scenario
Priority outputUrgent, scheduled, monitored, or accepted with named owner and compensating control
Urgent when S + M exceeds QScheduled when migration completes before the risk window closesMonitored when the installation lacks enough evidence to score confidence
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · crypto topology
Edges are the evidence
08
Cryptographic security happens on communication relationships, so Secure must treat edges as first-class evidence objects.
A
Hybrid PQ
B
ECDHE
C
ECDHE
E
ML-KEM
D
Relationship record
The evidence object that decides protection
Source identity, destination identity, protocol, TLS version, key establishment, signature algorithm, cipher, certificate, trust chain, first observed, last observed, evidence source, confidence, and policy status.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · market gap
Vendor tools miss the path
09
Each vendor can correctly report its own PQC support while the end-to-end customer path remains partially vulnerable.
1Clientobserved
2Ciscovendor claim
3F5unknown edge
4API gatewayobserved
5Java appvendor claim
6Kafkaunknown edge
7Oracleobserved
8HSMvendor claim
Vendor view
Support status for one component
Version 12.4 supports ML-KEM. The claim can be true and still fail to prove the customer’s full application path.
QASO view
Observed behavior across the customer estate
Secure maps the path. Assure validates claims against evidence. SOAR routes approved remediation when a path violates policy.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · reusable primitive
Bigger than PQC
10
Expected security state versus observed security state applies to TLS, certificates, segmentation, and legacy services.
TLS
Version drift
Policy requires TLS 1.3. Secure observes TLS 1.2, TLS 1.0, and plaintext on real device paths.
Certificates
Trust-chain drift
Policy expects approved enterprise certificates. Secure finds expired, self-signed, or unexpected certificates on alternate ports.
Segmentation
Reachability drift
Policy allows camera-to-NVR traffic. Observation shows extra routes to internet, PLC, or corporate database targets.
Legacy services
Protocol drift
Policy allows SSH. Observation finds HTTPS, Telnet, SNMPv2c, or vendor maintenance services still reachable.
Product thesis
PQC becomes one use case of a broader verification architecture
The same Secure, Assure, and SOAR primitives can track required state, observed state, evidence source, claim confidence, named owner, and governed response.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · legacy estate
Legacy risk stays honest
11
QASO should never claim a legacy device became quantum-safe if the device still talks classically inside a local segment.
PLCNo PQC patch guaranteed
CameraNo PQC patch guaranteed
BMS controllerNo PQC patch guaranteed
Medical deviceNo PQC patch guaranteed
Badge readerNo PQC patch guaranteed
HVACNo PQC patch guaranteed
PrinterNo PQC patch guaranteed
IoT sensorNo PQC patch guaranteed
Protected truth
Boundary traffic can gain PQC or hybrid protection
Gateway-to-gateway communication can use a secure overlay when traffic crosses a defined trust boundary.
Residual truth
The local device segment may remain classical
QASO records that residual exposure, the compensating controls, and the named risk owner instead of overstating safety.
The overlay should protect selected boundary crossings, not blindly tunnel every packet everywhere.
OT zone
PLCCameraHMIBMSIoTHVAC
QASO gateway
PQ or hybrid protected overlayEncapsulated legacy traffic
QASO gateway
Datacenter
AppsSIEMNVRHSMAPI
Implementation boundary
What the slide proves
The legacy endpoint remains unchanged. The original packet gets encapsulated by the gateway. The receiving gateway decrypts and forwards the original traffic. QASO records which segment stayed classical and which boundary received protection.
QASO POST-QUANTUM SHEETS · platform architecture
Evidence to action
13
Secure and Assure feed the control plane. SOAR governs the response and can task the data plane under approved scope.
Secure
Observe
Maps assets, crypto posture, reachability, attack paths, unsupported systems, and communication relationships.
Assure
Validate
Replays claims against evidence sources, attaches provenance and coverage, and marks stale or unsupported claims.
SOAR
Govern and execute
Opens cases, routes approvals, signs action scope, tasks relays or gateways, and verifies the result.